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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
A. E. UPTON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
L. H. HEISELT, RAY HEISELT, V.
M. SAMUELS, MRS. V. M. SAMUELS, ELIZABETH BREEN, L. R.
WATTIS COMPANY, a Corporation, W ATTIS SAMUELS COMPANY, a Corporation, and HEISELT
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Corporation, and Unknown Heirs,
Defendants,

Case No. 7430

L. H. HEISELT and HEISELT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Corporation,
Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
APPELLANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS CONTROVERTED IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARSr.
In paragraph 1 of Appellants' Statement of Facts near
the end they say ((for about seven years prior thereto" (Tr.
3
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1). With respect to the payment of taxes for seven years a
perusal of the Complaint, Transcript Page 3, at the top of
the page and the last clause of what is paragraph 2 continued
from the preceding page reads, CCAnd that the Plaintiff now
is and ever since the 29th day of. May, 1941, has been the
owner in fee simple of all the real estate hereinafter described."
On this point a review of Plaintiff's Exhibits S, T and U shows
that there was a payment by the Plaintiff to the County for
tax deeds in January of 1937, also a payment by the Plaintiff
to the County for tax deeds and auditor's deeds in May 1941,
and that the taxes for the years 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945,
1946, 1947 and 1948, were paid by the Plaintiff after he obtained the auditor's tax deeds from the County on the 29th
~ay of May, 1941.
A perusal of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Page 3 of the Transcript of Record will disclose that the statement ccfor about
seven years prior thereto" refers to the period prior to January
4, 1937, and the inference from the Statement of Facts of
the Appellants that the taxes hadn't been paid by the Plaintiff
Respondent for a period of seven years as is required under
adverse possession is not a fact.
As to Paragraph 2 of Appellants' Brief, Page 4, the Respondent controverts the impression gained from that paragraph. Although the allegations of L. H. Heiselt's Answer
may have denied the validity of the tax deeds, later on and
in the evidence and in the pretrial statement, it is shown that
the validity· of the tax deeds is tacitly admitted and was
admitted in the pretrial under the following circumstances:
On Page 21 of the Transcript, Paragraph 4 reads,
4
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is stipulated that. Plaintiffs Exhibits A~ B~· C, D,
~· :: \. ·,'·~: E, F and G attached to Plaintiffs Complaint may be
admitted in evidence by the Plaintiff. The Defendants
represented, however, do not admit the legal effete of
the said Exhibits and do not admit the Plaintiff obtained
title therefrom except as trustee."
:-'

-:L~

.. · ·;

·":~((It

Also on Page 121 of the Transcript, at paragraphs 7 and 8,
HThe Court finds that the only issues involved in the
presentaton of the Plaintiff's case on the Complaint
will be: (a) The adverse possession alleged in the Plaintiff, which the Defendant denies, claiming that the
possession was held in trust. (b) Whether the Plaintiff made improvements and the amount thereof."
Therefore, paragraph 2 of the Appellants' Brief at Page 4
is misleading in that the Defendants admit that in legal effect
the deeds represented by Plaintiff's Exhibits A, B, C, D, E,
F and G are valid if received by the grantee therein as trustee.
That is no doubt why the Court in its paragraph 7 quoted above
stated what the issues involved in the presentation of the
Plaintiffs case would be. It was discussed at the pretrial
as to whether proof of deed could be made· of these deeds
":"'the preliminary procedures leading up thereto, and it was
decided that the only issues involved in the presentation of
the Plaintiffs case were those set forth in paragraph 7 (a)
and (b) in the pretrial statement above referred to (Tr. Page
121). Attention is called to the fact that the counsel for
Appellants signed that as a fair statement of the pretrial.
Referring to paragraph 3 of Appellants' Brief, Page 4,
that paragraph, like many of the others, is merely a reference
to what was alleged, and not what was proven. The record.
shows that V. M. Samuels made no claim to any of these lots
5
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or to an interest in them. At Transcript 120, paragraph 1, it
is shown that the appearance of V. M. Samuels and Mrs. V.
M. Samuels by way of demurrer which was never served was
stricken from the files and the default of V. M. Samuels and
Mrs. V. M. Samuels was entered by the Court. It is to be
further noted that this case was set down for trial on the June
calendar of 1949 (Tr. Page 109), then later referred back
to the presiding Judge (Tr. Page 110), then set down for trial
in the September term of the Court ( T r. Page 111) . In the
meantime, the month of August, 1949, the Appellants herein
procured from V. M. Samuels some quit-claim deeds to some
of the properties mentioned in the Complaint and the record
shows further that Exhibits 29, 30 ·and 31 of Defendants are
those quit-claim deeds. The record shows that the grantor,
V. M. Samuels, was not in the chain of title, except perhaps
as to partial interest in one of the lots, to-wit, 36, and it is
quite questionable whether the abstract of title would show
that. (See Tr. Pages 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, · 390 and
391.)
As to the fourth paragraph of Appellants' Brief, Page
4, the fact is that, in the amending of the answers and counterclaims in many respects, the issues are resolved to a quiet
title action. The Defendants base their sole defenses on a
partnership relationship, a trust relationship, and1or a co-tenancy
relationship (Tr. 31-40, 125-127). It is to be noted as a
matter of fact that this action went to trial on the basis of
these defenses and no other. Attention is called to the fact
that the Defendants never through the whole record brought
up the matter of a mortgagor-mortgagee relationship and
6
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brought it up for the first time in this action upon appeal to
this Supreme Court.
The Respondent concedes paragraph 5 of the Appellants'
Statement of Facts (Appellants' Brief, Page 4).
As to the ~ixth paragraph of Appellants' Brief, Page 4,
the Appellants indicate that the record shows that none of
the Defendants, other than themselves, have any interest in
the property. Respondent contends that the fact is that the
records show that none of the Defendants have any interest
in the property.
As to the first full paragraph of Appellants' Brief, Page
5, Respondent admits that it is a nice thing to assist the Court
in clarifying different individuals; however, the record does
not show that Heiselt Construction Company was not qualified
to do business in the State of Colorado, and also the Respondent contends that the record does not show that L. H. Heiselt,
Heiselt Construction Company and V. M. Samuels owned
the lots in Salt Lake City, title to which the Plaintiff sought
to quiet in him. As a matter of fact, the record shows that
the Bankruptcy Court in Denver in the order contained in
Plaintiff's Exhibit J ruled that the Defendant, L. H. Heiselt, had
no interest whatever in any of the real properties sought to
be quieted in the Plaintiff in this action, that the Heiselt Construction Company formerly owned only a partial. interest in
some of the lots. Therefore, Appellants' statement in this
paragraph does not conform with the facts in the record. This
is also borne out in Plaintiff's Exhibit H, which is the abstract
of title to this property in which the title is being sought to
be quieted in the Plaintiff Respondent.
7
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In regard to the second full parag~aph of Appellants'
Brief at Page 5, the testimony of L. H. Heiselt is that William
J. Christensen did some work for L. H. Heiselt and Heiselt
Construction· Company in the year 1936; did some work in
1938 and 1939 .. The record does not show that he was given
a power of attorney in 1941 or 1942, nor during that time was
he associated with Ben Roberts in the filing of a suit for L. H.
Heiselt, Incorporated, v. Brown-Schrepferman Co. It will be
noted that the record shows (Tr. ·Page 375-381) in the testimony of Heiselt that William J. Christensen assisted Ben
Roberts in the preparation and filing of a complaint in the
suit of L. H .Hieselt, Incorporated, v. Brown-Schrepferman
Co. in the latter part of December, 1938.
The third full paragraph of Appellants' Brief, Page 5,
does not reflect the true facts as shown by the record. In the
middle of Page 381 of the Transcript, in answer to a question:
I told him that there was some railroad tracks down
there at the yard that were on tbe Utah Construction
ground, the yard, that we would have to get them, that
it was my rail."
((The Court: This should be confined to this property. There is no need of adding anything about personal property unless it pertains to this particular
groun d . . . ''
t t

And at Transcript Page 382:
((I told him to take them off, that 'we had orders to
pick the track up and sell the rail ... "
((The Court: I don't think this is material. His
testimony about the tracks is stricken.''
8
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Referring to the first paragraph of Page 6 of Appellants'
Brief, it states on May 4, 1936, an account was opened in the
National City Bank in the name of L. I-I. Heiselt; the record
does not show this. In fact, .it is shown by Defendants' .Ex..
hibit 14, the statement of account of the National City Bank
of Denver in the name of L. H. Heiselt, that on May 1, 1936
there was a balance carry-over from the previous month ,of
$214.91. Exhibit 9 referred to by the Appellants is not a
bank statement, and the testimony of· Upton shows definitely
that he knew nothing about that and had nothing to do with
it (Tr. 239, 244, 245). So let us refer to Exhibit 14 again;
it shows a deposit of $1,000 on May 11, a deposit of $1,000.00
on May 18 to the account of L. H. Heiselt, but there is no
showing of who made the deposits. The testimony in the
record shows that there were loans from Peterson and Upton,
each for $1,000.00, and these may have been the deposits
indicated on May 11 and May 18 of $1,000.00 each, but the
record shows that those were merely loans and the statement
in the Appellants' Brief, above referred to- Page 6, first
paragraph thereof-is not borne out by the testimony that
Peterson deposited or that Upton deposited the $1,000.00
deposits. The statement that other deposits were subsequently
made by Peterson and Upton is not borne out by the record.
The record does show that L. H. Heiselt and Heiselt Construction Company received further loans and they may or
may not have been deposited in these accounts (Tr. pp. 226,
227, 342,431, 432, 433, 434). However, they probably were, but
not by Upton or Peterson. Referring to the Exhibit 14, the
second sheet thereof, the balance on June 1, 1936, was $1.89.
There is no showing in the record that there was ever a transfer
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of the account of L. H. Heiselt to Heiselt Construction Company. The Plaintiff's Exhibit P showing the July 1 balance
of $1,3 36.5 7 is the first of the bank statements of Heiselt
Construction Company. There may have been a previous
statement to Heiselt Construction Company, but when this
bank account was opened or whether it was transferred from
L. H. Heiselt account or not is not borne out by the record.
It would make no difference if it was.
In the second full paragraph of Appellants' Brief, Page
6, it is stated that conferences were had with L. R. Wattis,
who at the time apparently represented certain companies. It
seems that Appellants beg the question by using the word
Ctapparently." There is no showing that L. R. Wattis represented any of these companies or had written power of attorney as required by the Statute of Frauds. Appellants claim
that Upton went to the office of Ben E. Roberts in the Newhouse
Building and dictated an Option Agreement, Exhibit 3, which
was signed by Wattis for all of these companies. The record
definitely shows that none of the contesting Defendants or
their witnesses knew who dictated this option and that it is
denied by Upton that he dictated it (Tr. 207).
The last paragraph on Page 6 of Appellants' Brief is
controverted by the Respondent in this respect: that the record
does not show that A. E. Upton accepted the option, Exhibit
3. In fact, the telegram referred to of July 4th was signed by
L. H. Heiselt and he admitted signing it, (Exhibit 18) although the body of that telegram may have been written by
A. E. Upton, and was an acceptance as a matter of fact, if an
acceptance at all, by L. H. Heiselt. The said option, Exhibit
10
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3, states that it runs to L. H. Heiselt and A. E. Upton, or
either of them. (Tr. 207, 234, 238, 247, 275, 292 to 302, 449,
450).
Referring to first full paragraph of Page 7 of Appellants'
Brief, the check for $400.00 referred to was a check drawn
by L. H. Heiselt; it was his own check, which is Exhibit 16
(Tr. 247).
The · second full paragraph of Page 7 of Appellants'
Brief is controverted. The record shows that the exercising
of the option, Exhibit 3, is purely an individual matter of
L. H. Heiselt (Tr. 201, 202, 203, 204, 207, 234, 238, 247,
275, 292-305, 341, 342, 449, 450). (Exhibits 2, 15 and 18).
The third full paragraph of Page 7, Appellants' Brief,
is misleading in that it was not a check of A. E. Upton but
was a Heiselt Construction Company check and was issued,
as per the testimony of A. E. Upton, at the request of L. H.
Heiselt (Tr. 458).
The last paragraph of Page 7, Appellants' Brief, is misleading in view of the testimony of A. E. Upton that he knew
nothing of this and it was purely a matter of sending the
conveyances to a bank for collection, and the quit-claim deed,
(Exhibit 1) as shown by the testimony of A. E. Upton, never
came to the personal attention of A. E. Upton but was handled
in the usual course of business of the bank, if handled at all
(Tr. 255).
First full paragraph of Page 8, Appellants' Brief gives
the impression that a fee was paid to Ben E. Roberts of $300.00,
Exhibit 34. The Court's attention is called to the fact that
11
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this Exhibit is personal check· of L. H. Heiselt to Ben E.
Roberts.. There is no showing in the record as to what that
check was for (Tr. 459).
In the second full paragraph of Page 8, Appellants'
Brief, we note a correction in the body of the indented part
of the letter (Exhibit 5), the fourth line should read uwith
instructions from," instead of "for."
The last paragraph of Page 8 of Appellants' Brief is
controverted. The second sentence reads ((For the services
rendered by Mr. Roberts, he was paid $200.00 by check dated
September 1, 1937." The records do not show that such
check was paid for any such services, and it was the check of
L. H. Heiselt, Incorporated, a Colorado Corporation (Tr.
Page 215, 230, 232).
The first full paragraph of Page 9, Appelants' Brief, is
controverted in this: there· is no showing in the record that the
option agreement was ever taken by the Plaintiff in this action;
in fact, it is denied it was ever taken and the record shows
that it was never exercised by Plaintiff; and it is very indefinite
as to what taxes are referred to therein,-there is land in
California and other places (Tr. 212, 214, 233). In fact,
that option agreement, Exhibit 3, is very general and does not
specifically describe the land in this action. The second .sentence
of the paragraph is misleading in that said payments were
made out of some account opened in the National City Bank,
Denver, and it is not indicated what accounts are meant. It
may have been an L. H. Heiselt account, Heiselt Construction
Company account, or L. H. Heiselt, Incorporated, account.
It is not shown by the record. It is further noted that the im~
12
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pression trying to be conveyed by the Appellants· is that the
payments were made out of, for and on behalf of and from
this account by Upton to take the tax deed in 1937. The
record definitely shows that the check for $1225.00 used to
buy the title from the County in January, 193 7, was a personal
check of A. E. Upton from his own personal account and with
his own personal money, and that is admitted in the pretrial
statement by the contesting Defendants herein (Tr. 120, 121,
210, 233).
i

.

.

The second full paragraph of Page 9 of Appellants' Brief
is misleading in this respect: In the first sentence it is said
ttthat at the time the property was purchased from the county."
It is not shown which purchase is referred to, whether the
one of January, 1937, or the May sale of 1941. The quitclaim deed referred to from L. R. W attis Company to Heiselt
is Exhibit 1 and was never recorded until in May of 1946, .as
stamped · on the Exhibit. The second sentence of the said
paragraph states the deed was being held by the National
City Bank. It was held by the bank for collection, but never
under the personal control of Upton (Tr. 255). Further,
Upton's testimony undenied was that he had never seen that
instrument, that it may have been at the bank and it may have
been turned over to Mr. Buckle, but not to his know ledge as
to that specific instrument (Tr. 255). He has much business
as he stated and can't be bothered by the details which are
taken care of by the personnel of the bank. In so far as all
references to Mr. Frank McLaughlin, the Referee in Bankruptcy in Denver, and all of the transactions that transpired
between Buckle and Dunn and Heiselt and the Referee in
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Bankruptcy, the records show that it was an attempted compromise (Tr. 372-374).
As to the last paragraph of Page 9 of Appellants' Brief
it is noted that the Appellants are attempting to show that
the facts are that Upton purchased the property here in question in the May sale of 1941, from Salt Lake County, while the
deed (Exhibit 1) was in the hands of the bank (Tr. 225). It is
a general practice of people to send matters to banks for collection or to be handled by the personnel of the bank. Let
it be noted here that the National City Bank of Denver is a
separate legal entity from the Plaintiff, A. E. Upton.
The first paragraph of Page 10 of Appellants' Brief is
controverted. In the second line thereof, Appellants state,
((in the matter of making a complete settlement.-" The records
show that there was not any complete settlement (Tr. 252,
358-375) (Ex. 17, 37, 38). The records show that it was
entirely a matter of Heiselt going to Denver trying to negotiate
some kind of compromise as is pointed out by the Court in
the rulings as to the admission of Exhibits 17, 37 and 38 (Tr.
252, 358-375). Furthermore, the record shows that Exhibit
17 is a copy of a letter and that the signature at the bottom
is in Heiselt' s handwriting. In fact, Heiselt admitted in
the record and in his testimony that he signed A. E. Upton's
name at the bottom of that letter (Tr. 366).
The last paragraph of Page 10 and the first and second
paragraphs of Page 11 of Appellants' Brief, should be clarified. The Appellants try to convey an. impression by using
the word ((Settlement." In fact, the body of the instruments,
Exhibits 37 and 38 and 17, if admissible, definitely show an
14
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__ attempted compromise, and the Court so ruled. (For the
assistance of the Court, at the last sentence of the second paragraph of Page 11 above referred to, the Appellants have the
reference as Transcript 326; we believe it should be Transcript
426).
The last paragraph of Page 11, Appellants' Brief, is
again purely a matter of attempted compro1nise, an extraneous
matter in which A. E. Upton was not involved (Tr. 372-374).
The Statement of Facts shown in Appellants' Brief on
Pages 12, 13 and to the first full paragraph of Page 14, are
controverted by the Respondent as being misleading and is
concerned with some matters of conferences between A. E.
Upton and V. M. Samuels. Let it be noted again that the
record definitely shows that V. M. Samuels does not claim
any interest whatsover in the subject matter of this action (Tr.
120, 121).

In the first full paragraph of Page 14, Appellants' Brief,
Appellants make reference to Exhibit 9 as a bank account.
Exhibit 9 is not a bank statement, was not prepared by the bank
or A. E. Upton as shown by the evidence and testimony of
A. E. Upton that he had never seen it before, and is no part
of the bank records (Tr. 239, 244, 245).
As to the second sentence of paragraph 1 herein mentioned, the record shows that at times the Heiselt Construction
Company in pursuance of its jobs depleted its bank account (Tr. 265 to 274), and the record shows, undenied
by Heiselt, that he requested Upton and Peterson to attempt
to keep the men from quitting work for not receiving their

15
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pay (Tr. 265 to 274, 448). All of these checks were issued
in pursuance to the above request and upon promise of L. H.
Heiselt to repay the monies (Tr. 431-448). All of these
checks, including Exhibit 35, as the record and testimony of
Heiselt shows, were for the railroad contracts and they have
never been contested or protested by Heiselt or the Heiselt
Construction Company (Tr. 434 to 448).
Second full paragraph of Page 14, Appellants' Brief, is
not true. In fact, the testimony of Mr. Heiselt and of Ben
E. Roberts is that Mr. Roberts was fully aware and knew that
A. E. Upton purchased the property in question in this action
in the May sale of 1941. Mr. Roberts was there and he admits
that he knew that it was brought by Ernest B. Upton for his
brother, A. E. Upton (Tr. 485, 486). As far as the matter
of V. M. Samuels or anyone else being on notice, the record
is notice. It also might be noted that there is no showing that
any of these contesting Defendants ever offered the County
or Upton payment of the taxes, or attempted to redeem them
at any time over a period of many years. And as for the last
clause of the paragraph, referring to Samuels, or any other
references to Samuels, it has no bearing on this matter so far
as the Plaintiff. herein and contesting Defendants are concerned.
The last paragraph of Page 14, Appellants' Brief is controverted. T~ere is no evidence that William J. Christensen
for many years was employed by Heiselt or Heiselt Construction
Company, or either of them; or that they paid him any money
as late as 1942 to represent them, or that he was in charge of
any lots or put a man in possession of anything for and on
behalf of Heiselt or the Heiselt Construction Company. In
16
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fact, the testimony of L. H. Heiselt definitely shows 't~at. so
far as the subject matter of this action is concerned there
never was any employment of William J. Christensen in
relation to these lands; that the employment in 1936 in Colo:rado and for a short time in 193 7 and the assistance given
Ben Roberts on a brief in December of 1938, is the only such
employment, except for the matter of the sale of some rail
which \vas on Utah Construction Company property and the
Defendant L. H. Heiselt' s statement and testimony shows that
he \Yas ordered to take that off (Tr. 380, 381). This employment had nothing to do with the land here in question.
Furthermore, in the last part of the paragraph which appears
on Page 15, Appellants try to create the impression that the
notice to Garff was given by the Heiselt Construction Company
prior to the contract between Garff and Upton, which is untrue.
The record shows to the contrary (Tr. 191, Ex. 1 and 42).

RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action to quiet title to certain lands located in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. At one time these lands
were owned by a certain group of individuals, one of whom
was the Heiselt Construction Company, which was formerly a
part owner of part of these lands (Exhibit H). Early in January,
1937, Respondent, A. E. Upton, purchased by tax deed from
Salt Lake County for the sum of $1225.00 the property in
dispute, and paid for the same with his personal check ( T r.
120, 121, 210, 233, 323, 325, 327, Ex. D. E. F, and G).
Mr. A. E. Upton and Mr. L. H. Heiselt, one of the Appellants
17
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herein, orally agreed that Mr. Upton would permit Mr. Heiselt
to purchase this property from him for the sum of $1225.00
together with interest, provided that Mr. Heiselt paid the taxes
on the said property as they became due each year thereafter
(Tr. 250 and 251). At no time thereafter did Mr. Heiselt
pay any of the taxes on the said property when due, or at
all, and in 1941, said property again went to tax sale by Salt
Lake County (Tr. 485, 486). At that time, Mr. A. E. Upton,
the Respondent herein, had his brother, E. B. Upton, an attorney
from Denver, Colorado, come to Salt Lake and bid on this
property at the tax sale (Tr. 250, 251, 485, 486). At the
time of the bidding, Mr. Ben E. Roberts, President of the
Heiselt Construction Company, was present and heard Mr.
E. B. Upton bid on this property and purchase it in the name
of A. E. Upton (See Tr. 486). Ever since said date Mr. A.
E. Upton has been in actual possession of said property, either
personally or by agent, has paid all the taxes thereon (Tr.
456, 45 7, Ex. S. T. U), and has insured said property against
fire and has paid the premiums therefor (Ex. K, Tr. 279).
Appellants herein admit that Mr. A. E. Upton purchased said
lot at said tax sale, but claim the title which he obtained thereby
was held in trust for the Appellants (Tr. 120, 121). At pretrial it was admitted that legal title vested in A. E. Upton
and the sole question is whether or not this property was
being held by A. E. Upton in trust for L. H. Heiselt, A. E.
Upton and E. H. Peterson, either by virtue of a partnership,
as a co-tenancy or an implied trust (Tr. 31-40, 120, 121, 125127). The lower Court- found that the evidence adduced
by Appellants failed to prove the necessary elements of any
trust, partnership, or co-tenancy. (See Findings of Fact, Con18
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elusions of Law, Tr. Page 152-155). The only evidence, if
any, of a trust relationship contained in ·the record is in the
testimony of L .H. Heiselt on direct examination. Appellant
L. H. Heiselt, petitioned in bankruptcy in 1940, and in said
bankruptcy Schedule A, he did not list · any obligation
'vith respect to a debt to A. E. Upton as a mortgage or
otherwise relative to the real estate involved in this action
(Ex. J), and he did not in Schedule B in said bankruptcy list
this real estate, or any parts thereof as an asset, nor did he
list or mention any assets in or claims respecting this alleged
partnership or any partnership or cotenancy whatever (Ex.
J). L. H. Heiselt alleged that certain contracts executed in
the name of the Heiselt Construction Company were actually
performed by a partnership consisting of A. E. Upton, Elmer
H. Peterson, and himself, but the proof at the trial failed to
sustain any such allegations. The income tax returns of the
Heis_elt Construction Company conclusively controvert the
pa~tnership, trust and co-tenancy contentions in that all profits
realized and all income realized from these construction projects
were reported in the income tax returns of the Heiselt Construction Company, a corporation, and taxes computed and
paid thereon (Tr. 419-429, Ex. L, 25) and L. H. Heiselt admits
no income tax returns for the alleged partnership were filed
(Tr. 425). These Heiselt Construction Company returns cover
the entire period alleged by Mr. Heiselt to represent the alleged
partnership activity (Tr. Page 419-429). In addition, any
partnership was denied by A. E. Upton (Tr. Page 489, 490).
There is no evidence in the record at any place as to co-tenancy.
There is no evidence in the record to support the contention
of an implied trust. All of the facts claimed by Appellants
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in their brief on· appeal are in support of the allegations of
partQ.ership, rather than in support of the allegation of an
implied trust, and the trial Court in its Findings of Fact found
that the allegations of the Appellant, L. H. Heiselt as to
partnership were not proven and not true ( T r. 15 2-15 5) .
The contention propounded by the Appellants in their
Brief as to a mortgagor-mortgagee relationship is first brought
forth on appeal. Nowhere in the record is there any allegation or claim that l\1r. Upton loaned money to the Appellant,
Mr. Heiselt, and took title to this property as security for a
loan. In fact, the record shows that L. H. Heiselt at the time
of the 193 7 tax sale to A. E. Upton had no title whatsover
to any of this property (Ex. H and J). The record shows
that at most there was some oral conditional sales contract and
that L. H. Heiselt failed to perform any of the terms thereof.
If this mortgage claim had been alleged in the pleadings, it
would have been possible for the Plaintiff to meet such claim
and he could and would have met such a claim and refuted it.
From the testimony adduced at the trial, the Court found
for the Plaintiff in all particulars, found the facts as alleged
by the Plaintiff to be true and the facts as alleged by the
Defendant to be false (Tr. 152, 153, 154 and 155).
The Plaintiff pleaded the statute of limitations and statute
of frauds in his demurrers and also in his CtReply to Answer"
and CtAnswers to Counterclaims."

20
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON.·
'

'

I.

I

•

•

~

'

•

I

,.,.,r

1. 1941 TAX SALE AND AUDITOR'S DEED PASSED
TITLE IN FEE SIMPLE TO A .. E. UPTON. . .
2. 1941 AUDITOR'S DEED-VALID. OR INVALID

-CONSTITUTES COLOR OF TITLE AS A .BASIS OF
TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION IN A. E. UPTON.
3. A. E. UPTON ALSO PERFECTED TITLE IN FEE
UNDER ADVERSE POSSESSION.
4. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Respondent still relies on his allegations of Statute of
Limitations wherever applicable.

5. STATUTE OF FRAUD APPLIES.
(a) All inadmissible evidence under the Statute of .Frauds
relating to transfers of interest in this land, except as to implied
trust which was not proved, is still relied upon by Respondent.

6. NO IMPLIED TRUST PROVED.
7. NO PARTNERSHIP PROVED.

8. NO CO-TENANCY PROVED.

9. MORTGAGOR - MORTGAGEE RELATIONSHIP
IMMATERIAL.
21
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
1941 TAX SALE AND AUDITOR'S DEED PASSED

TITLE IN FEE SIMPLE TO A. E. UPTON.
Appellants herein concede that the tax deed obtained by
A. E. Upton, Respondent herein, on May, 1941, conveyed title
to Mr. Upton. They claim, however, it was conveyed to him
purely in trust (Tr. Page 120, 121). If this deed is valid for
the purpose of conveying title to him in trust, it is valid for
all purposes, so far as procedural steps prior to the deeds are
concerned, and if the trust failed, the deed is still valid as far
as he is concerned and as far as the Appellants in this case·
are concerned. All procedural steps taken prior to the May
sale of 1941, have been conceded by the Appellants in this
case, so there is no necessity of arguing and presenting the
procedural steps. This contention is corroborated by the fact
that the lower Court in its pretrial statement found that:
(t

(7) The Court finds that the only issues involved

in the presentation of Plaintiff's case on the Complaint
will be: (a) The adverse possession alleged in the
Plaintiff which the Defendants deny, claiming that
the possession was held in trust; (b) Whether the
Plaintiff made improvements and the amount thereof."
(Trans. 121).
This finding of the Court in the pretrial order is also an admission on the part of the Defendants that the Plaintiff in
this case had possession of the property during the entire
time claimed, the Defendants, however, claiming the possession
was held in trust for them. This further shows that they base
22
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their defense on a trust agreement or fiduciary relationship
of some kind which was not pr<?ved by the testimony or evidence adduced at the trial.

POINT 2
1941 AUDITOR'S DEED-VALID OR INVALID-

CONSTITUTES COLOR OF TITLE AS A BASIS OF TITLE
BY ADVERSE POSSESSION IN A. E. UPTON.
The pretrial order (Tr. 121) states ccThe Defendants
represented, however, do not admit the legal effect of said Exhibits A, B, C, p, E, F and G, and do not admit that the
Plaintiff obtained title there£rom except as trustee." It was
the understanding of counsel for the Plaintiff in the case that
the Defendants thereby admitted that title passed to the
Plaintiff by virtue of these tax deeds, but claimed title passed
to him only as trustee. Issue was joined on Appellants' alleged
defenses of partnership, implied trust and/ or co-tenancy which
they failed to prove. Counsel for Plaintiff interpret this to
mean that Counsel for Defendants admit that this is a good
and valid conveyance to A. E. Upton for the purpose of passing
title, but that he held it only as a trustee. This is further
corroborated by the paragraph (7) before quoted of the pretrial statement which shows the Court's and attorney's understanding of the stipulation, and that no evidence was required
as to the validity and propriety of the auditor's tax deeds involved evidenced by Exhibits A, B and C (Tr. 121). However, from the Brief of Appellants, it is apparent that Appellants have had a change of mind since the ruling of the Court
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below. Counsel· for Respondent in this ·matter majntain th~t
in. any event the auditor's tax deed gives color of ··title .to A.
E.. Upton as a basis for adverse ·possession. This .Court has
many times ·held. that a tax deed,·. even though void, .is sufficient to give color of title. Lords v. Murphy, 147 P. 903, ,4-5
Utah 612; Weiner v. Stearns, 120 P. 490, 40 Utah 185; Baker
v. Goodman, 194P. 117, 57 Utah 349.

POINT 3
A. E. UPTON ALSO PERFECTED TITLE IN FEE UNDER
ADVERSE POSSESSION.

Appellants in their brief continually recite allegations contained .in their pleadings but cite no evidence adduced at
the trial in support of those allegations. Nowhere in their
appeal brief do Appellants attempt to make the facts in the
case at bar conform to the facts contained in the authorities
cited by them. In other words, they have taken certain
authorities, and are assuming that the facts in this case correspond with the facts in the cases cited. In the cases cited
by the A ppellantes there was evidence, and it was found,
that a co-tenancy or a partnership or an implied trust existed.
Nowhere in their brief do they point to any evidence in· the
record which would prove any of the allegations of co-tenancy,
partnership or implied trust.
The very least that can be said in behalf of the respondent
in this case is that he took color of title as is pointed out in
the preceding sections. Appellants admit that he went into
24
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possession of said property at that time and has been in possession ever since (Tr. 121), (Pretrial Order, paragraph 7).
Appellants claim, however, that the possession of Respondent
in such case was as trustee. Therefore, they tacitly admit
his possession during the entire period in controversy. And
Appellants have failed to prove the elements of any trust,
implied or otherwise, as is hereinafter set forth (Respondent's
Brief: Page 30-35.) The Respondent, A. E. Upton, not only
went into possession and continued in open notorious and
adverse possession during the entire period of time, but paid
taxes on said property during the entire period of time. This
was admitted by the Appellants in the pretrial order as is
shown by Exhibits S, T and U, which the Appellants at the
trial admitted subject to a check as to the figures contained
therein being correct (Tr. 456, 457). The entire period of
time referred to is all subsequent to the May sale of 1941,
which is all subsequent to the second time that Respondent,
A. E. Upton, purchased this property from the County.
Respondent is not unmindful of the fact that the Supreme
Court of this State ruled that the purchase of property at tax
sale did not constitute the payment of taxes and that the delinquent taxes that led up to such tax sale could not be used
as a part of the period of time under adverse possession.
But Exhibits S, T and U show that the Respondent lpaid the
taxes for the years 1941 to and including 1947, which is
a full seven years, and the evidence in the case shows that the
Respondent also paid the 1948 and 1949 taxes (Tr. 456,
45 7) . Therefore, although the taX.es assessed and which
constituted the basis for the County's title which they sold in
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January, 1937 and in May, 1941 to A. E. Upton may not
be used in computing the payment of taxes under adverse possession, the period of time subsequent to the May, 1941 sale
which included the taxes for the year, 1941, and all subsequent
years were paid by the Respondent, A. E. Upton for more
than seven years prior to filing this action. In showing the
adverse possession by A. E. Upton since the May sale of
1941, the evidence shows that one H. J. Watson, one of the
witnesses for the Respondent, rented the property from A.
E. Upton; that A. E. Upton made improvements on the property
(Tr. Pages 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176 and 177). 'fhe
Respondent, A. E. Upton, made improvements on the buildings on this property (Tr. Pages 194 and 195). This improvement was made in 1942 (Tr. Page 194). Further improvements were made in 1945 leading up to the rental by
H. J. Watson (Tr. Pages 171 and 172). Also, in 1946 improvements were made while the Garffs were in possession
as a contractee with the Respondent, A. E. Upton (Tr. Pages
186, 187), in the sum of $5,780.19. Respon~ent, A. E. Upton,
insured these properties since 1941 (Tr. 279, Ex. K). In
addition and in furtherance of his claim of ownership as
against the entire world, Mr. A. E. Upton on March 18,
1946, entered into a contract for the sale of this property
to Mark Gar!£ (Ex. I), and Mr. Garff went into possession
of said property by virtue of said contract and is still in
possession thereof. In said contract, the Respondent, A. E.
Upton, agreed to quiet title to said property so as to give to
the buyer a warranty deed. The possession of A. E. Upton
on this land was open, notorious, uninterrupted and peaceful
under claim of right, and will be presumed to have been from
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its inception adverse as to the holder of legal title. Toltec
Ranch Company v. Babcock, 24 Utah 183, 66 P. 876; affirmed
191 U. S. 542, 48 Law. Ed. 294.
Weiner v. Stearns, supra, states:
ttTax sale initiates new title, and any possession that
was taken by virtue of such new title is prima facie
adverse to the original title."
({Character of possession cannot always be determined from declarations of party in possession, but
whenever possession is of such character that ownership may be inferred therefrom then possession ordinarily may be presumed to be hostile to the rights of
true owner, that is if party places permanent structures
upon land belonging to another and uses land and
structures the same as owner ordinariiy uses his land,
then in absence of something showing contrary intention claim of ownership may be inferred in favor of
party in possession." Pioneer Investment and Trust
Co. v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City, 35 Utah
1, 99 P. 150.
In the case at bar, A. E. Upton not only claimed ownership, but he rented the property, he insured the property, he
made improvements thereon, contracted to sell the property
and in all manner acted as, and claimed to be, and was the
true owner of said property. Appellants have in no place
denied the adverse, open notorious possession of A. E. Upton;
in fact, they admit the possession but claim it was as trustee,
but they proved nothing to substantiate a trustee relationship
(Tr. 120, 121).
See also Baker v. Goodman, supra, where the Court held:
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((Where the Defendant purchased tax deed from
County and .immediately .entered into possession of
property' paid taxes on property for statutory time,
made. valuable improvements on proper,ty and held
property openly and notoriously, he was entitled to
have title to property in controversy against all parties,
except those under disability.''
c

In the case at bar, there are no parties under disability.

POINT 4
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Respondent still relies on his allegations of Statute of
Litnitations wherever applicable.
Respondent herein by demurrer and by reply has pleaded
the Statute of Limitations and continues to stand on all of
the Statute of Limitations pleaded, and Respondent further
avers that if the Court below had properly ruled on his special
demurrer on the grounds of the Statute of Limitations that any
claimed error on the part of the Appellants would not and
could not have been admitted or produced. In view of the
fact that no proof of an implied trust was adduced at the
trial, all_ evidence submitted by the Defendants, Appellants
herein, should have been stricken from the record. Under the
pleaded Statute of Limitations the Court should have granted
the motion for judgment on the pleadings made by attorneys
for the Respondent at the commencement of the trial, and
also at the pretrial of this case the overruling to which counsel
for Respondent took exception (Tr. Pages 81, 88, 89, 124,
128, 164 and 166).
28
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POINT 5
STATUTE OF FRAUDS APPLIES.
All inadmissible evidence under the Statute of Frauds
relating to transfers of interest in this land, except as to implied
trust which was not proved, is still relied upon by Respondent.
It is to be noted at the outset of this point, that L. H.
Heiselt personally was not a former fee record owner of any
interest in the land in question in this lawsuit (Ex. J, last
seven pages). (Ex. H). Although Exhibit 1 of the J?efendants is dated in 1936, the Court's attention is called to
the fact that it was not delivered until 1944 or 1945 (Tr.
289 to 301) and it was not recorded until May 13, 1946, and
it is so stamped thereon. This is a case in which the Plaintiff,
A. E. Upton, purchased certain lands in Salt Lake County
in January, 1937, and then he orally agreed to sell the said
lands to L. H. Heiselt upon payment by L. H. Heiselt to A.
E. Upton of $1225.00 and interest thereon provided L. H.
Heiselt pay each year the taxes thereon and thereafter as
the same became due. This is an agreement between two
people to purchase land from a third person, the County,
and comes squarely within the statements of the case of Chadwick v. Arnold, 95 P. 527 at Page 530, 34 Utah 48, in which
the Court states in part:
((This brings us to the real question in the case:
whether the statute of frauds applies to such case as
testified to by the plaintiff. It, of course, is readily
conceded that a mere oral agreement to purchase land
from another is within the statute of frauds. So, too,
it is conceded that if A, having no interest in the real
estate, orally agrees with B that the latter should pur-
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chase it with his own funds and take the title in his
own name, and that he should thereafter convey it to
A upon an agreed price, no resulting or constructive
trust arises, and that such a contract is also within the
statute of frauds ... " The foregoing cases should be
carefully distinguished from those in which there is a
mere verbal promise to purchase and convey land. In
order that the doctrine of trust ex maleficio with respect to land may be enforced under any circumstances, there must be something more than a mere
verbal promise, however unequivical, otherwise the
statute of frauds would be virtually abrogated; there
must be an element of positive fraud accompanying
the promise, and by means of which the acquisition of
the legal title is wrongfully consummated. Equity
does not pretend to enforce verbal promises in the
face of the statute; . . ."

POINT 6
NO IMPLIED TRUST PROVED.
In this case the Appellant, L. H. Heiselt, did not live
up to the verbal agreement and failed to pay the taxes as
agreed (Tr. 250, 251). There is no fraud whatsover shown
on the part of the Respondent, A. E. Upton; in fact, if any
fraud is involved, it is on the part of L. H. Heiselt, who
induced A. E. Upton to spend $1225.00 of his own money
with the understanding that L. H. Heiselt would buy the
property and pay the taxes on the property in question as they
accrued after 1936. L. H. Heiselt fraudulently failed, neglected
and did not pay any of these taxes, and when the property
was up for tax sale again, in 1941, through no fault of the
30
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Respondent he was at that time required to and under necessity
did again purchase the land from the County to protect his
own investment therein. Furthermore, prior to the second
purchase of the land in May, 1941 by the Respondent, A. E.
Upton, the Appellant, L. H. Heiselt, filed a petition in banktuptcy in Colorado iti the year 1940, and in his schedules
did not list any debt due A. E. Upton relative to this property
and did not list this property in his assets, or any interest in
this property. If the Appellant, L. H. Heiselt, had at any
time intended to purchase the property from A. E. Upton
and pay A. E. Upton the said $1225.00 plus interest thereon
and taxes, he had at this time abandoned any such intention.
His verified bankruptcy petition admits an abandonment of
any such intention or any claim under the oral arrangements
made with Mr. Upton when title was taken in 193 7 to this
property. It will be noted that the last seven pages of Exhibit
J were on an unverified petition in bankruptcy filed approximately eight years after the original petition was filed, by the
debtor therein who is one and. the same person as the L. H.
Heiselt, the Appellant herein.

.,;
/

In order for the Court of equity to find an implied or a
constructive trust, it is necessary that fraud be shown on the
part of the person on whom it is desired to impress the trust.
In this case there is no evidence in any manner whatsover of
fraud on the part of Mr. Upton. He is not realizing any profit
or gain from the ownership of this property. He has paid for
taxes and purchase price from Salt Lake County on said property
in excess of $2700.00. In addition to that, he has realized
no interest on his money since 1937. That there has been some
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$6;ooo.oo:of improvements put upon the land and -in addition
when this laws~it is terminated, -he will have to pay' his attorneys' fees and he is now out the cost of this proceeding
up to this time. Mr. Upton is not only financially in the hole
ir1this matter but he has agreed to sell and has entered into
a contract of sale with Mark B. Garff for the sum of $3,000.00.
If and when he realizes the total purchase price from this
p~operty, he will suffer a financial loss in the transaction of
approximately $1500.00. This is not a matter of a person
attempting fraudulently to do another person out of money,
but is purely and simply an attempt on the part of Mr. Upton
to realize as small a loss as is possible in the transaction. In
fact, all he is doing in this case is attempting to salvage as
much as he can from a ccbum deal." Counsel for Appellants
have laid much stress on the fact that in April or_ May of 1946,
L. H. Heiselt went to Denver to the National City Bank of
Denver, in an attempt to make some compromise in this matter
with the Respondent, A. E. Upton, and the record further
shows that when they went to the office of Ernest B. Upton
in the Majestic Building in Denver, Colorado, Mr. Ernest B.
Upton informed his brother, Mr. A. E. Upton, that he could
not make any corr1promise about this property with Heiselt
because he had already bound himself contractually with
Mark B. Garff for the sale of this property, to which he agreed
to quiet title and convey to Mark B. Garff, (Tr. 364). Counsel
for Respondent particularly call the attention of the Court
to the fact that the Mark B. Garff contract was made on
March 18, 1946, and that it was a month or so thereafter that
L. H. Heiselt attempted to negotiate with A. E. Upton. We
use the word "negotiate" advisedly because in all the cor-
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respondence and so forth set forth in the exhibits of the Defendants, is the word t~negotiate" which is synonymous with ncompromise" and was ruled by the lower Court to be an attempted
compromise when it rejected the Exhibits of the Defendaf?.tS
numbered 17, 37 and 38 (Tr. 358-375). Certainly, in this
case if any fraud has been visited by one person upon another
as a result of the arrangement between the Appellant, L. H.
Heiselt, and the Respondent, A. E. Upton, in January of 1937
when this property was bought from Salt Lake County by
A. E. Upton, the fraud was upon Upton as is clearly shown
by all of the subsequent actions relative thereto. Had the
Appellant, L. H. Heiselt, performed his part of that agreement, and paid the taxes and purchased from A. E. Upton
this property for the money expended by Upton plus interest,
there would have been no argument whatsover. However,
through the default of L. H. Heiselt, one of the Appellants,
in failing to perform his part of that agreement and pay the
taxes for the years subsequent to that purchase, and allowing
that property to go to County title and to tax sale in May,
1941, he forced the Respondent, A. E. Upton, to do what
he did to protect his investment, and even after the May sale
of 1941, six or seven years passed before L. H. Heiselt made
any move toward claiming any of this property from A. E.
Upton, or contesting his tax title or title by adverse possession
thereof.
If the trust agreement is neither a constructive nor a
resulting trust, it must be an oral trust. This case does not
meet the conditions necessary for an oral trust.
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In the case of Capps v. Capps, 110 Utah 468; 175 P. (2d)
470, 473, the Court stated:

((The substance of the rules announced in those cases
is that where a party seeks to establish a trust by parole,
the evidence must be clear, convincing and unequivocal.
The evidence must be clear and unambiguous. It must
be convincing and satisfy the trier of the facts that it
is free from fabrication. It must be definite, so that
no doubt is left as to the subject matter of the trust
or trust res, or the rights and obligations of benficiaries
and trustee. Testimony which is designed to establish
a trust must be carefully scrutinized to ascertain whether
it is so attended with such circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness that it it entitled to credence. The
evidence must clearly show not merely an intention
to create a trust, but some act or declaration sufficient
to show that such intention was properly carried into
effect. See Hanson v. Hanson, Utah, 171 P. (2d)
392. None of the elements of a trust can be left to
conjecture. The evidence must be such that it will
clearly lead to the conclusion that a specific property
in controversy is held by the person sought to be
charged as trustee, for the use and benefit of others.
((Does the evidence in this case meet the tests of
(Evidence which is clear, unequivocal, satisfactory and
convincing?' To determine this question, we must
scrutinize the entire record, including the exhibits, and
the relationship of the parties; for what may constitute
adequate proof in one situation may not be satsifactory
evidence in the light of other relationships. If the
claims made in view of the established circumstances
are inherently improbable, or happen to have been
asserted under circumstances which would infer that
they are are result of (wishful thinking,' the evidence
would be considered unsatisfactory . . . It is the
function of Courts of equity to enforce obligations
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which were created by acts of the parties, not to fashion
new obligations out of rights improvidently established.''

POINT 7
NO PARTNERSHIP PROVED
Section 69-1-3 and Section 69-1-4 of U. C. A. 1943,
defines a partnership and sets forth some rules for determining
the existence of a partnership. A perusal of the evidence
adduced by the Appellants at the trial of this matter failed
to show any proof of the necessary elements of a partnership.
The most that can be said is that Mr. Upton and Mr. Peterson
and the National City Bank of Denver loaned monies to L.
H. Heiselt, individually, and the Heiselt Construction Company in connection with the financing of the operations under
its contract with the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad. The
evidence adduced at the trial by both parties shows that the
monies received from Mr. Upton and Mr. Peterson and the
National City Bank of Denver were entirely loans; that those
loans, together with interest, were repaid at various and sundry
times (Tr. 263-289, 314, 317, 431-449, 452, 467-470). The
evidence clearly shows that the Heiselt Construction Company
and L. H. Heiselt were in a low financial condition; that these
loans were made perhaps through a past friendship and without
any particular amount of security. It is a fact that banks
or individuals sometimes loan money on the force of contracts
that the borrower has with strong companies such as the Denver
& Rio Grande Railroad, and expect to receive the repayment
of their loans together with interest on the force and faith
35
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of those contracts. · Furthermore; in instances wherein the
s~turity is nil, or very shaky 'and the risk is gre~t, the investi:
gations by the loaning agency or loaning individual is ·much
greater than in cases where the security for the loan is of low ·
risk and adequately covers the .loan. In this case, it is true
that Mr. Upton went about to determine the status and nature
of the progress of the work, because of the risky condition of
the security; it is true that he made trips around to look over
the equipment, real property and other ~hings that the construction company claimed it had with which to perform these
contracts. It would be the grossest type of business inefficiency
for a loaning agency or a person loaning money not to make a
thorough investigation of the assets, abilities, etc., of the
borrowers. The most that can be said of all of the evidence
adduced by the Defendants at the trial as to the activities of
Upton in going over the works and camps in connection with
the performance of the Rio Grande contracts is that it was
purely by way of determining whether or not their loans were
safe, whether or not there was adequate probability of a
repayment thereof. Nowhere in the evideNce is it shown
that Mr. Upton, the National City Bank of Denver or E. H.
Peterson received from L. H. Heiselt or the Heiselt Construction
Company a cent more than the principal and interest on
these loans. In one instance a $3,000.00 mortgage to real
estate ad joining the property here in question was taken
and a case was filed in 1943 in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
to realize on that part of the numerous loans that were made
in connection with the work under the contract of the Ap·
pellants with the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad. The
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Appellants in the lower Court in the trial of the case at bar
made no effort whatever to show that A. E. Upton, Elmer H.
Peterson or the National City Bank of Denver participated in
any manner whatsoever in the profits from those contracts.
In fact, they make no effort to show what profits or losses were
made on those contracts, and make no effort whatsoever to
show that there "ras anything received by Elmer H. Peterson,
A. E. Upton or the National City Bank of Denver from those
profits. On the contrary, a perusal of the entire trial shows
that the matters were purely loans accompanied by investigations. The Court's attention is called to the fact that the
$1225.00 of the personal money of A. E. Upton with which
he bought the lands in litigation in this case in January of
1937 had nothing to do with the operation or performance
of the contracts between the Appellants and the Denver &
Rio Grande Railroad.
40 Am. Jur. 145, under the Title C(Partnership," sub-title
UD," ((Tests for Indicia of Partnership," Sections 32 et seq,

sets forth in full the necessary elements of a partnership.
It is submitted that the evidence adduced in this case fails to
show a partnership and the necessary elements of a partnership
are entire!y lacking.
The evidence as shown by Exhibits M and N and 0, which
are contracts between the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad and
the Heiselt Construction Company, a Corporation, and the
income tax returns of the Heiselt Construction Company, a
Utah corporation, which L. H. Heiselt himself admitted reflected all of the income and business transactions with respect
to those Rio Grande Railroad Company contracts, conclusively
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show that the work and operations in connection with the contracts with the Rio Grande Railroad Company were not partnership contracts or activities, but Heiselt Construction Company
activities. This is corroborated by the fact that in Exhibit
J, which is the petition in bankruptcy of the Defendant, L. H.
I-!eiselt, there is ( 1) no claim that he is one of the alleged partners, (2) nor any claimed partnership or partnership activiti~s,
and assets, ( 3) nor any claim to any property of a partnership
such as he alleges between himself, A. E. Upton and E. H. Peterson. The bankruptcy petition was filed in 1940, which was about
four years after the completion of all of the contracts and
work for the Denver & Rio Brande Railroad. Clearly, from
the record it is apparent that the idea of a partnership in
connection with any of these matters is an afterthought on the
part of L. H. Heiselt.
Th Court's attention is called to the fact that there was
no written agreement of partnership. Appellants attempted
by their evidence to try to convert the activities and operations
in connection with the contract between the Rio Grande
Railroad and Heiselt Construction Company into an activity
of a so-called partnership between L. H. Heiselt, A. E. Upton
and Elmer H. Peterson, but failed to do so.
An abstract from 40 Am. Jur. Page 130, under the title
of ((Partnership" Section 6, reads:
((Public policy does not permit a co-partnership to
do business under the guise of a corporation, or allow
the partners to be a corporation as to the rest of the
world while as between themselves the enterprise conducted in the corporate form is in fact a joint venture
of partnership ( 5) ."
38
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Note 5 cites Seitze v. Michel, 148 Minn. 80, 181 N.W. 102;
12 A.L.R. 1060; also Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N. J. Eq. 592,
75 A. 568, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 658.
As \Yas stated before, there was no partnership proved.
The necessary elements in no respect were shown, and the
Respondent denies that there was any partnership whatever.
Certainly, there could not be the type of a partnership as is
alleged by the Appellants, being against public policy as hereinbefore cited. It is quite apparent that the partnership idea,
or the idea that there ever was a partnership was an afterthought
on the part of L. H. Heiselt and a figment of the imagination.

POINT 8
NO CO-TENANCY PROVED
It is the contention of the Respondent that there was no
showing whatever in the record of a co-tenancy relationship
between A. E. Upton, L. H. Heiselt, E. H. Peterson, Heiselt
Construction Company or any of the other Defendants. In
Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed., Vol. 4, Page 366,
Sec. 1831, under ccEssential Attributes of a Tenancy in Common," it is stated:
CCA tenancy in common exists where property is held
by several distinct titles by unity of possession, neither
knowing his own severalty, and, therefore they all occupy promiscuously. It is not an estate, but a relation between persons. A tenant in common has as such no
interest in his co-tenant's title to the common property.
The only unity of tenants in common in the property
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,. .,

heid by th~rrt as sl.lch by several "'and distinct titles· is
unity of possession. No unity other than that ·of pos,.
session is essential to a tenancy in common, and, h~nc~,
the destruction of any of the other unities of a joint
tenancy changes the estate to .one in common. Unity
of possession, however is the very essence of a ·tenancy
in common; without it, such a tenancy cannot exist.
It is an essential attribute of a tenancy in common that
there shall be ·a unity of possession or of the right to
possession in two or more persons . . . . "

It is submitted that nowhere in the testimony of the Defendants, or otherwise in the Court below, is there any showing
to establish the necessary attributes of a tenancy in common.

POINT 9
MORTGAGOR-MORTGAGEE RELATIONSHIP IMMATERIAL.
For the first time on appeal to the Supreme Court, the
Appellants make the contention and claim that the payment
·of $1225.00 by the Respondent to Salt Lake County, in January,
193 7, and taking the tax deeds that are represented by Exhibits
D, E, F and G is and gave rise to a mortgagor-mortgagee relationship. The evidence at the trial and the testimony of A.
·E. Upton and L. H. Heiselt indicate that when A. E. Upton
bought the tax deeds from the County represented by Exhibits
D, E, F, and G, and paid the $1225.00, he actually purchased
this ground in which L. H. Heiselt individually had no interest,
and that there was some oral agreement that if Heiselt would
pay all of the taxes subsequent thereto and buy the property
from A. E. Upton for the $1225.00 plus interest, that A. E.
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Upton would sell it to L. H. Heiselt. If that was a conditional
sales agreement, it was oral. It seems that such oral sales
agreement might be within the ~tatute of frauds and not binding on A. E. Upton. Even if it wasn't L. H. Heiselt failed to
meet the terms of the oral conditional sales contract, if any,
by not paying the taxes, and by taking out bankruptcy without
listing any debts or claims with respect to this property in
either Schedules A or B thereof, and then permitting this
property to go to county tax title and be resold in 1941.
This Supreme Court in the case of Smyth v. Reed, et ux,
28 Utah 262, 78 P. 478, had the question of whether a situation
involved a conditional sales contract or mortgage. In that
case this Court held that, where the one person sold to another
by absolute conveyance and then received back a separate
instrument whereby the Seller could under certain terms
and conditions repurchase from. his grantee, that that
was not a mortgage but a conditional sale, in that there
was no clear, convincing unequivical proof that it was intended
as a mortgage. This case is somewhat in poi!lt on the results.
However, the fact remains that L. H. Heiselt had no prior
interest in this property, and even if he did, that case would
still apply. The case here in issue is stronger in favor of the
Respondent for the reason that there can not be a mortgagormortgagee relationship between L. H. Heiselt and A. E.
Upton because the mortgagor must have some interest in the
real property that is the subject matter of the mortgage. Here
Heiselt did not (Tr. Pages 250, 251).
Appellants contend in their Point V on Points to be Relied
Upon (Appellants' Brief, Page 16) that when A. E. Upton
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bought the property herein in litigation from Salt Lake County
in January of 1937, the .deeds were intended as a mortgage
and that L. H. Heiselt, the individual, was the mortgagor and
A. E. Upton was the mortgagee.
Even if the tax deeds to A. E. Upton from the County
in 19 37 are considered to be a mortgage, which the Respondent
here definitely denies, under the authorities Heiselt can not
sustain recovery anyway. The record definitely shows that
it was the obligation of L. H. Heiselt to pay the taxes on this
Property under the oral conditional sales agreement with Upton
-he failed to do that-and there is no showing whatever
that A. E. Upton was obligated, if we consider him as a mortgagee, which he denies, to pay any taxes at all. So, in the
sale of May, 1941, any mortgagee who was not under obligation to pay the taxes could have gone to the tax sale and
bought that property and his tax title would have been valid
and the ownership would have passed to him. With respect
to the holdings of the Court as to the purchase by a mortgagee
at the May sales from the County, where mortgagee is under
no obligation to pay taxes, attention is called to the dissenting
opinions of Justice Folland and Justice Wolfe in the case of
Hadlock· v. Benjamin Drainage District, 89 Utah 94, 53 P.
(2d) 1156,_ 106 A. L. R. 876, 881 et seq and 883 et seq.

CONCLUSION
Counsel for Respondent respectfully submit that the Appellants conceded the validity of the tax deeds held by the
Respondent, and particularly the tax deeds of the Mav sale
'
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of 1941; that even if there is some question as to validity of
the tax deeds, the Respondent obtained good fee title by
adverse possession based upon these tax and auditor's deeds
as color of title; that the Appellants have failed to prove
partnership, implied trust, tenancy in common or any fiduciary
relationship, which were the bases of their defenses; that the
Defendants' contention of mortgagor-mortgagee relationship
which is brought up for the first time on appeal can avail
them nothing, under the facts, for the reason that the Appellant
L. H. Heiselt was under obligation to pay these taxes and failed
to do so, and the Respondent, even if he may be considered
a mortgagee, was under no obligation to pay the taxes and the
title he obtained in the May sale of 1941 is a good and valid
title.
Therefore, Counsel for the Respondent respectfully submit that the lower Court should be affirmed in its judgment
and decree in this matter.
Respectfully submitted,
MUSSER, GIBSON, MUSSER and
CHRISTENSEN.
Attorneys for Respondent.
307 Utah Oil Building,

Salt Lake City, Utah.
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